I still think this is ready. The only new commit (6a4c423) is a docs change: a warning block in traffic-routing.md saying explicit app discovery requires app names that are a single lowercase DNS label. The DNS code and tests are the same as when I last reviewed.
App-name casing: your probe corrected one of my claims. I said a mixed-case app name "fails closed". In fact, web.MixedApp.app.miren is lowercased and resolves to a different app named mixedapp if one exists. That's a misdirect, not an empty answer. Lowercasing the stored keys would merge app identities that app creation currently keeps distinct, so I agree that documenting the limit is the right scope for this PR. The new warning covers what a reader needs to know: uppercase or dotted names can't be targeted, and query capitalization can't choose between MyApp and myapp. Real support for those names belongs with a naming or alias policy, as you said. I've resolved that thread.
Tenancy: the cross-app tenancy question still stands. Someone who owns the product's isolation story should sign off before merge, and you've left that thread open for them. That's also why I'm not recommending that this skip human review.
Posted to the PR's comment threads when you submit.
web.MixedApp.app.miren is lowercased and can resolve to a separate mixedapp. Since MixedApp, mixedapp, and mixed.app are distinct app IDs today, lowercasing the map keys would merge identities, which is worse. You've persuaded me not to normalize here. The warning in traffic-routing.md states the lowercase single-label requirement and the case-collision behavior plainly, and that's the right scope for this PR. A naming or alias policy can take it from there.Verdict: ready
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"owner": "mirendev",
"repo": "runtime",
"number": 1414,
"verdict": "ready",
"event": "comment",
"summary": "I still think this is ready. The only new commit (`6a4c423`) is a docs change: a warning block in `traffic-routing.md` saying explicit app discovery requires app names that are a single lowercase DNS label. The DNS code and tests are the same as when I last reviewed.\n\n**App-name casing:** your probe corrected one of my claims. I said a mixed-case app name \"fails closed\". In fact, `web.MixedApp.app.miren` is lowercased and resolves to a *different* app named `mixedapp` if one exists. That's a misdirect, not an empty answer. Lowercasing the stored keys would merge app identities that app creation currently keeps distinct, so I agree that documenting the limit is the right scope for this PR. The new warning covers what a reader needs to know: uppercase or dotted names can't be targeted, and query capitalization can't choose between `MyApp` and `myapp`. Real support for those names belongs with a naming or alias policy, as you said. I've resolved that thread.\n\n**Tenancy:** the cross-app tenancy question still stands. Someone who owns the product's isolation story should sign off before merge, and you've left that thread open for them. That's also why I'm not recommending that this skip human review.",
"replies": [
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"thread_id": "PRRT_kwDONZ__ss6wgV_T",
"body": "Thanks. That's an accurate summary of what the patch does and doesn't change: it affects discovery only and adds no firewall, RPC, or workload-identity permissions. I'm leaving this open for the product/tenancy owner, as you suggested."
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"thread_id": "PRRT_kwDONZ__ss6wgV_Z",
"body": "Thanks for actually probing this. It corrects my comment. I said the explicit form fails closed for mixed-case names, but `web.MixedApp.app.miren` is lowercased and can resolve to a separate `mixedapp`. Since `MixedApp`, `mixedapp`, and `mixed.app` are distinct app IDs today, lowercasing the map keys would merge identities, which is worse. You've persuaded me not to normalize here. The warning in `traffic-routing.md` states the lowercase single-label requirement and the case-collision behavior plainly, and that's the right scope for this PR. A naming or alias policy can take it from there.",
"resolve": true,
"resolve_reason": "persuaded"
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"posted_to_pr": true,
"head_sha": "6a4c423b5200518cfa9e24bb3d3a2afa084f8ce6"
}I think this can move forward. The fix solves the actual bug: handleAppMirenQuery used to take parts[0] and ignore every other label, so web.other-app.app.miren quietly returned the caller's own web. Now the target app comes from the name, and anything with more than two labels before .app.miren, or an empty label, gets an empty authoritative answer. Nothing falls back to the caller's app anymore. The explicit-target override runs only after the caller is recognized, so an unknown source IP still gets nothing, for both A and the new <app>.app.miren TXT path. PTR is untouched and still scoped to the caller's app.
On tests: the fixtures in TestAppDiscovery are deliberately lopsided. The caller has only web, the target has web ×2 plus db. That's what makes db.app.miren → nil and web.missing.app.miren → nil real checks that nothing leaks back to the caller's app, rather than results that would pass by accident. Running every case against both a known and an unknown source, and for both A and AAAA, covers the caller-recognition rule and the IPv6 behavior in one go. The only *.app.miren forms I found in pkg/ are <service>.app.miren, the bare app.miren TXT, and the PTR target. So I don't see an existing hostname form, such as instance-specific names, that the stricter parser breaks.
Why I'm not recommending skipping human review: this deliberately changes a documented boundary. Before, the docs said internal DNS was same-app only. Now any recognized sandbox can look up IPs for, and list services of, any app whose name it knows. The ticket asked for this, and the docs now say clearly that this isn't an isolation boundary. Still, someone who owns the product's tenancy/isolation story should confirm that's acceptable for every deployment shape. That matters most if more than one team or tenant can share a cluster, because this is the change that makes other apps' services discoverable, even though the network was already reachable.
A smaller question for that reviewer: handleRequest lowercases qname, and the lookup compares that against appMD.Name verbatim. I couldn't find any rule requiring app names to be lowercase and dot-free, so an app named MyApp or my.app couldn't be targeted by the explicit form. It fails closed (no answers), so it's not a safety issue. But if such names are allowed, the docs' promise of <service>.<app>.app.miren won't hold for them. Service names already had the same limitation, so this is worth a quick check, not a blocker.
qname is already lowercased in handleRequest, but appServiceToIPs is keyed by appMD.Name exactly as stored. If app names can contain uppercase letters or dots (I couldn't find validation that forbids either, and miren init --name passes the name through unsanitized), the explicit <service>.<app>.app.miren form can never resolve for those apps. It fails closed, so it's safe, but it's worth confirming app names are guaranteed to be DNS-label-safe, or else normalizing the map keys.Verdict: ready